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Abstract 
 In the article I will try to define Chinese macro-strategy in investing 
in Afghanistan. Then, analyzing data collected on the field with an interview, 
I will try to examine Afghan perception of Chinese presence. After data 
analysis I will try to establish if Chinese strategy is useful to the picture that 
China wants to show of its presence in Afghanistan  and what are the 
possible correction for making  it much efficient.   
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Introduction: 
 China is strongly present in Afghanistan from 2002, just after the fall 
of taleban. China, without any military involvement either in ISAF or 
“Enduring Freedom “, took immediately part in a team of nation to rebuild 
Afghanistan. China participated to all the International meetings on 
Afghanistan (Bonn 2001, London 2006, Paris 2008, The Hague 2009, Bonn 
December 2011). China also hosted in Tianjin the Istanbul Ministerial 
Process, the major regional meeting between Afghanistan and its neighbors 
in 2014, assuming an higher profile in shaping the future of Afghanistan 
(Zhao, 2015).  
 China motivation in staying in Afghanistan can be considered 
through two possible interpretations. The first is the realistic interpretation 
(based on the assumption that China is attracted just by the Afghan 
resources),  the second is security-leaded interpretation (improve 
Afghanistan security and disrupt terroristic groups linked with extremist 
groups operating in China to create a solid economic cooperation). 
 During my last mission in Afghanistan (March-October 2011) and 
thank to two of my collaborator that collected interviews for me (between 
September 2012 to December 2014) I realized a collection of Afghan 
perception of China intervention at various level (population, regional 
government, Kabul governmental). The interview submitted is composed by 
three simple and direct questions: What do you know about China presence 
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and initiatives in Afghanistan, do you think they are useful to Afghanistan 
too or just for China? What you think about Chinese presence: is it going to 
enrich Afghan and its population (in any way) or not? Do you think China 
presence in your country is it going to increase in future and you think is this 
a positive or negative factor? We submitted interview to a number (4873 
subjects) of population in the provinces of: Herat, Kabul, Helmand, Badghis 
and Kandahar. 
 In the article I will try to explain the main motivations of China 
permanence in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and, analyzing the data 
collected on the field, asses if there is correspondence of analysis and what 
perceived from population. I will try to demonstrate if China joined its 
objectives with a positive perception of its soft power or a negative one and 
to delineate what could be the better adjustments to do to its staying in the 
area for better achieving its goal to maintain its soft-power picture. Afghan 
perception of China presence is fundamental for three main reasons. First of 
all Afghanistan is facing an intensive democratization process based also on 
ethnic integration. A negative perception of China presence could feed 
tension among ethnic groups, some of them more opened to integration with 
Chinese people, some of them are more narrow. A second motivation for 
which a positive image of China it’s really important in country’s future is 
that a negative picture could be used by extremist groups to strengthen their 
positions. Looking to China point of view we find the third reason for 
considering common Afghan perception of Chinese presence so important. 
China is basing its international policy on the soft-power concept of peaceful 
rise and to be seen as an hegemonic/imperialist power in a first impact 
scenario for international public opinion (as it is Afghanistan of post-NATO 
intervention) could have a really negative impact on its image. In some areas 
(as emerging from interview) China interest in resources exploitation and 
economy in general find the direct concurrence of Iran (strongly present in 
Herat and Farah provinces with FDI in particular) (Zonis, 2015). Soft-power 
field will probably where there will be major competition between Iran and 
China to obtain particular relations with Afghan economy of post-war 
period. 
 In my analysis I will try to assess if China presence in Afghanistan is 
really based on soft-power, and explain in which cases this is successful and 
in which not. I will try as well to define what could be better improvements 
for this strategy and so what we should expect from PRC on the next years.    
 
I.: 
At the end of military intervention in Afghanistan China has become the 
third country for volume of investments. Since 2010 China started to 
increase investment in Afghanistan. In 2013 China presence in Afghanistan 
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can be assessed in a total of: 2,9 billion of USD invested in mineral sources 
extraction and 400 million of USD invested in energy production (mainly 
exported to China)i China’s most notable efforts include a $3.5 billion 
project for the development of the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province and 
all the infrastructures (transport and electricity-generating facilities) 
(Heritage Foundation, 2015). That is the largest foreign direct investment in 
Afghanistan’s history. Investments in mines have been realized under the 
aegis of Afghan Ministry of Mines Wahidullah Shaharani. China’s biggest 
part of investments are concentrated in mines and facilities regarding them.  
By the 2015 NATO withdraw from Afghanistan it has almost completed 
but Afghanistan is still not self-sufficient and, as reminded by afghan 
officials in various occasions as President Ashraf Ghani did on 18 September 
2014. Afghanistan also signed on 30 September 2014 for the permanence of 
9800 US soldiers and 2000 NATO soldiers. 
China presence can be considered essentially trough two factors: 
realistic, and based on security motivation.  
The first factor is motivated by the  China needs of power and natural 
resources. This factor is especially highlighted by China investments in 
mines and oil plant. Afghanistan has abundant non-fuel mineral resources, 
including a wide variety of minerals ranging from copper, iron, and sulfur to 
bauxite, lithium and gold. China invested in copper mines like Mes Aynak   
in Logar Province and Aybak in Samangan and is looking for new, available 
resources sites (Downs 2013).  
The second factor of PRC presence in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan is to create economic and political conditions to avoid a future 
reborn of an extremist government (like Taliban) in Afghanistan. Political 
stability will be required for economic stability of Afghanistan and would 
give to China a more reliable partner in economic relationships.  In effect 
China and Afghanistan border for few kilometers but that border has been a 
chokepoint for passage of Islamic extremists (Ramannullah, 2010). China 
presence in Afghanistan is largely motivated by Chinese Communist Party 
concern over the stability of Xinjiang Region. That region, in Turkic 
definition named “East Turkestan” is the biggest threat to the stability of 
China coming from inside, while Afghanistan can be considered as the most 
impellent threat from outside. During taleban regime Afghanistan became a 
reliable safe haven for extremist coming from Xinjiang and a base for “East 
Turkestan” organizations. The Taliban were the spiritual agitator and 
material supplier for “East Turkestan” extremists. There are not yet certain 
indicators on how many extremist fled from China to Afghanistan to find a 
safe haven or to be trained and to fight in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 
and from 2001 to current day but they seems to be around thousands. So, as 
natural, any kind of interpretation has to take in consideration economic 
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motivations: first one as just resources exploitation or (second one) as the try 
to build a stable and reliable economy to cooperate with. The last 
interpretation is also the broader one and provide a more complete view of 
Chinese policy. In fact, in this vision China considers primarily the 
importance of its presence in Afghanistan as a stabilizing element to keep on 
exploit afghan mineral sources and, at the same time, is aware that giving 
chances for an economic development to a friendly government is going to 
reduce extremist fall-out in the country.  
So the second explanation, sustained also by an amount of bibliography 
(Gries, 2015, Keller & Rawsky, 2015, Yuan, 1999, Breslin, 2010, World 
Bank 2010) is the  most complete and probably the best to be taken in 
account trying to examine the perception of Chinese permanence in the area. 
Mechanism of increasing the presence and increment investments motivating 
them with a safety explanation too is important also in the building of 
Chinese smart power. China is asserting in its international relations to be a 
power in a 和平 发展 (peaceful development) starting from Hu Jintao Era. 
All the new Chinese Diplomacy is based on that concept of Peaceful Power 
and so it’s really important for PRC that every kind of Chinese foreign action 
is justified with peaceful motivations. 
Following this interpretation of Chinese behavior in the Islamic Republic 
is deeply linked to Afghan perception of China presence. In fact, as 
explained in the introduction, a bad perception of Chinese presence by 
Afghans could increase the risk of worsening the governance and increase 
extremism. A negative view of China behavior in a first media impact 
situation as post-NATO Afghanistan is  could also seriously damage the 
Chinese peaceful power general picture (Wo-Lap Lam, 2010). 
I collected data during my last ISAF mission deployment in 2011 and 
thank to some my colleagues employed in Afghanistan in 2012, 2013 and 
2014. We started to interview people from September 2011 (when Chinese 
presence in Afghanistan was already shaped) until 2015. 
We managed to interview three officials from Kabul government, 13 
people from Regional Government of Herat and 4873 subjects from 
population of the following provinces: Herat, Kabul, Helmand, Badghis and 
Kandahar. For clear cultural reasons around 90% of interviewed people were 
men. The difficulties that I faced in the field to interview women were 
bypassed (when it was possible), asking the elder representing the 
community or to a relative to be means of communication between female 
interviewed and interpreter. Shortage of women interviewed is mitigated 
from the not primary role that they have in Afghan political world. 
Unfortunately in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan women have still not a 
substantial equality of rights with men and in terms of policy and public 
opinion influence men’s point of view is much more relevant.  
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For the officials interviewed (central and regional governments) out of a 
total of 16, six were from Hizb-ut Tahrir Party (a really strong Islamic party), 
two represented the Wahadat Islami (another Islamic semi-radical force), 
four from Jumhori Afghanistan (a Republican moderate forces) and four (in 
Herat provincial government), were part of  regional movement. I tried to 
give the larger picture I could of the various movements, taking in account 
difficulties and obstacles in interviewing people.  
Ethnic issue is also a first importance aspect, Afghan ethnic composition 
is based in two main groups: Pashtun (43% of population) and Tajik (around 
16%), five less numerous (Hazara, Uzbek, Aymak, Turkmen, Baloch) and a 
large number of minorities (Pashai, Nuristani, Arabs, Pamiri ecc.). 
Traditionally Pashtun, a fierce population based on tribal uses and particular 
code of behavior (pashtunwali), are against ethnic integration and foreign 
presence is often seen as an interference in their tribal world. From Pashtun 
we should expect a negative judge on Chinese presence. Instead Tajik are 
more opened to integration and developed a more inclusive way of life, e.g. 
percentage of Tajik employed in State administration is higher compared to 
Pashtun. In my sample for interview I tried to respect ethnic percentage but 
that was possible just for Herat and Kabul (in the other areas, being already a 
good result to be able to interview people, I chose to take in consideration all 
the data collected). 
As a general consideration, sample interviewed are not proportionally 
corresponding to ethnic/genre of Afghan people composition but, 
considering the particular difficulty of the area I decided to elaborate them in 
any case. 
For all the interviewed people we proposed just three simple questions: 
1) What do you know about China presence and initiatives in 
Afghanistan, do you think they are useful to Afghanistan too or just for 
China?  
2)What you think about Chinese presence: is it going to enrich Afghan 
and its population (in any way) or not?  
3)Do you think China presence in your country is it going to increase in 
future and you think is this a positive or negative factor?  
I will examine first the answers given by officials from Kabul central 
government. 
China presence and 
initiatives in 
Afghanistan: do you 
think they are useful 
to Afghanistan too 
or just for China?  
Useful for both: 
3 
Useful just for 
China: 
0 
 
Chinese presence: is 
it going to enrich 
Enrich, especially 
economically: 
No: 
0 
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Afghan and its 
population (in any 
way) or not?  
3 
China presence in 
your country is it 
going to increase in 
future and you think 
is this a positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
2 
No: 
0 
No, negative: 
1 
Data referred to officials from Central Government of Kabul interviewed on the field in 
2011-2015. 
 
In examining first and second part of data we must take in account the 
political faction and the corruption problems emerged in Afghanistan 
especially in regional governments. Majority of interviewed are part of 
Islamic parties this could influence in a negative way the judgement of 
Chinese presence (as China is formally a communist state), despite of this 
the officials opinion is strongly positive. We should consider even corruption 
problem. Corruption, as recognized from Afghan government itself it’s one 
of the biggest problem of Afghan governance. Corruption in the country has 
really become impressive especially from 2010. In every kind of 
interpretation of officials declaration we should take in account that people 
interviewed could be involved in bribery linked to concession to Chinese 
Companies. Corruption could influence decision of conceding sources 
exploitation to China and the opinion about Chinese presence in the area. 
Anyhow the article it is not really interested in motivation of opinion 
released but in understanding what is the real opinion of Afghan people 
about Chinese presence (Gombert, Binnendijk and Lin, 2014) .  
The officials opinion of Chinese activities in the country is really positive 
and 2 of them are already thinking that China investments are going to 
increase in the nearest future and they hope so for Afghan economy. This 
particular situation could be result of a corrupt regime, but it’s anyway a 
good result for Chinese image and soft-power.   
Second part of data concerns regional governments, they are really 
partial because we were able to collect data just from Herat region (for 
logistic and security reasons).  
China presence and 
initiatives in 
Afghanistan: do you 
think they are useful 
to Afghanistan too 
or just for China?  
Useful for both: 
11 
Useful just for 
China: 
2 
 
Chinese presence: is 
it going to enrich 
Afghan and its 
Enrich, especially 
economically: 
9 
No: 
4 
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population (in any 
way) or not?  
China presence in 
your country is it 
going to increase in 
future and you think 
is this a positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
8 
No, positive: 
1 
No, negative: 
4 
Data referred to officials from Regional Government of Herat interviewed on the field in 
2011-2015. 
 
Data shown in the second table start to differentiate the view of Chinese 
presence, in particular we can notice this from answers to the second 
question. Four officials out of 13 from Herat Government think that 
economic investment of PRC in Afghanistan they are not going to enrich 
their country, at least economically. Some of them think that Chinese 
presence is a good deterrence for insurgency or a less incumbent to NATO 
forces, but they don’t think is an economical positive factor in this moment. 
This point is particularly important by the fact that has emerged from 
officials of a Regional Government. The fact could imply that Regional 
Governments are less touched by corruption related problems than Central 
regarding resources allocation and exploitation. This could happen because 
mines and mineral resources exploitation are generally allocated at Central 
political level by Ministry of Mines. A second cause for the slightly worse 
opinion of China presence could be the Iran influence in Herat area. Iran 
borders Afghanistan for 940 km, touching provinces of Herat, Farah and 
Nimruz. Iran is really involved in Afghanistan reconstruction and strongly 
interested in post-war Afghanistan economy, either for economical 
motivations and for religious/cultural motivations (Zonis, 2015). In fact 
Shi’a religion watch with a particular attention Afghanistan and will try to 
influence the new Islamic Republic particularly to avoid dangerous Sunni 
manifestation like Arab influence and taleban phenomenon. Iran invested in 
realizing an hospital in Herat and a power plant in Farah and both population 
gather economic advantages from borders exchanges. Iran, after the end of 
Iran-Pakistan pipeline project in 2013-2014 (for which project invested an 
huge amount of economic resources), has tried with its influence, to colder 
the project for TAPI pipeline, a concurrent pipeline supposed to cross 
Afghanistan starting from Turkestan for proceeding in Pakistan and India.  
While Iran is trying to pose obstacles to TAPI project China is strongly 
sustaining it. In fact China is trying to insert in the project a branch heading 
to its hub port in Pakistan (Gwadar) and it’s also supporting it’s special ally 
Pakistan. Actually Beijing has a special alliance with Islamabad lasting from 
1951, renewed through the years and renewed as Nawaz Sharif was elected 
as Prime Minister in 2013 (Magnani, 2012). So we can’t avoid to consider 
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confrontation of Pakistan (Sunni Islamic Republic) with Iran (Islamic Shi’a 
Republic and stronghold of Shi’a), and, in doing this consider that China 
position will probably be always supporting Pakistan (Ebinger, 2015). 
Pakistan government needs a moderate government in Afghanistan, 
preferably with a majority of Pashtun in administrative charges. First 
condition is necessary to have a safe neighbor with a good economy to 
cooperate with. While second aspect would be best option to create stability 
and conditions of governance in the Northern territories named Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These regions (inhabited by fierce 
Pashtun tribes) are nominally controlled by Pakistan, but ruled through a 
tribal system (similar to pashtunwali) by Pashtun, and frontier line is not a 
real border but much more a communication area between Pashtun 
populations. To have a moderate and friendly Pashtun government in 
Afghanistan would mean for Pakistan to have a better control of its FATA 
(Shah, Busha, 2015). For these motivations China and Iran are at the present 
concurrent with their presence in Afghanistan and, again, one of the better 
strategy to win the game can be convincing Afghan population of their more 
friendly role (compared to the other). 
When we pass to take in exams data collected from population of Herat 
we have a bigger amount of people interviewed and in these cases I decide to 
register also the number of people that didn’t want to answers to one or more 
questions. 
China presence 
and initiatives 
in Afghanistan: 
do you think 
they are useful 
to Afghanistan 
too or just for 
China?  
Useful for both: 
427 
Useful just for 
China: 
516 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
301 
Chinese 
presence: is it 
going to enrich 
Afghan and its 
population (in 
any way) or 
not?  
Enrich, 
especially 
economically: 
329  
No: 
563 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
352 
China presence 
in your country 
is it going to 
increase in 
future and you 
think is this a 
positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
212 
No, positive: 
227 
No, negative: 
124 
Yes, negative: 
363 
Prefer not to 
answer: 
318 
Data referred to Herat province population interviewed on the field in 2011-2015. 
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Total number of Afghans interviewed in Herat province is 1244, a lot of 
them didn’t want to answer to one or more questions giving various 
motivations. Percentage of people refusing to answer is around 25%, 
common population is still too influenced by the fear of insurgents to answer 
freely to the question and in some cases ignore completely the subject. 
Second case happens in Herat province because Chinese presence is really 
weak compared to provinces as Kabul or Mazar I Sharif. As shown from 
various indicators, Herat province there is a stronger presence of Iranian 
enterprises than Chinese enterprises (Committee on Foreign Relations US 
Senate, 2013). Anyhow Herat population examined shows a less positive 
vision of Chinese presence respect to the officials point of view and we can 
see that more than 50% consider it a negative factor or at least useless from 
the economic point of view. It should be highlighted in particular the answer 
on the fifth column of the third question: 363 Afghans out of 1244 
interviewed in Herat province believe that Chinese presence is going to 
increase in future and see this as a negative factor.  
After Herat I will examine data collected from population of Kabul: the 
capital.  
China presence 
and initiatives 
in Afghanistan: 
do you think 
they are useful 
to Afghanistan 
too or just for 
China?  
Useful for both: 
473 
Useful just for 
China: 
299 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
155 
Chinese 
presence: is it 
going to enrich 
Afghan and its 
population (in 
any way) or 
not?  
Enrich, 
especially 
economically: 
449  
No: 
237 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
241 
China presence 
in your country 
is it going to 
increase in 
future and you 
think is this a 
positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
374 
No, positive: 
137 
 
No, negative: 
216 
Yes, negative: 
96 
Prefer not to 
answer: 
104 
Data referred to Kabul province population interviewed on the field in 2011-2015. 
 
In Kabul province population interviewed is more supportive of China 
and Chinese initiatives in Afghanistan, in fact we can highlight the positive 
vision of a future bigger involvement of China in the area for 354 people out 
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of 927 interviewed. Near the capital population can express more freely their 
opinions without fearing insurgents threatening and we can deduce this  from 
fact that just 17% of population interviewed in Kabul province prefer not to 
answer. Better vision of China presence and more supportive attitude to 
Chinese investments can be assessed as a result of a better knowledge of 
Chinese presence. In fact Chinese presence in Kabul is one of the biggest in 
Afghanistan due to the mineral complex of Mes Aynak. Probably we can 
deduce (without prejudice) that a great part of negative perception of 
Chinese perception is due to scarce knowledge of their effective actions in 
Afghanistan.   
Then we can examine data coming from Helmand province, one of the 
most troubled from 2010 to current days. 
China presence 
and initiatives 
in Afghanistan: 
do you think 
they are useful 
to Afghanistan 
too or just for 
China?  
Useful for both: 
403 
Useful just for 
China: 251 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
391 
Chinese 
presence: is it 
going to enrich 
Afghan and its 
population (in 
any way) or 
not?  
Enrich, 
especially 
economically: 
 417 
No: 
237 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
391 
China presence 
in your country 
is it going to 
increase in 
future and you 
think is this a 
positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
326 
No, positive: 
128 
 
No, negative: 
137 
Yes, negative: 
70 
Prefer not to 
answer: 
384 
Data referred to Helmand province population interviewed on the field in 2011-2015. 
 
In the Helmand province, place of one of the strongest insurgent presence 
from 2010 to current days, we find a percentage of people refusing to answer 
running around 37%. Even if population is feared of contact with western 
people there is a good consideration of Chinese presence, e.g. the answer to 
the question “Chinese presence: is it going to enrich Afghan and its 
population (in any way) or not?” for 427 people is “Yes, especially 
economically”, 391 refuse to answer and just 237 say “No”. Among people 
interviewed there is a good perception of Chinese investments and investors 
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especially if compared to Herat province. In particular Chinese presence is 
seen as a good economical factor for helping the Afghan development.  
We can find data similar in Badghis, a poor province located in 
Northeastern part of Afghanistan (North of Herat). 
China presence 
and initiatives 
in Afghanistan: 
do you think 
they are useful 
to Afghanistan 
too or just for 
China?  
Useful for both: 
396 
Useful just for 
China: 281 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
301 
Chinese 
presence: is it 
going to enrich 
Afghan and its 
population (in 
any way) or 
not?  
Enrich, 
especially 
economically: 
 403 
No: 
274 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
301 
China presence 
in your country 
is it going to 
increase in 
future and you 
think is this a 
positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
377 
No, positive: 
117 
 
No, negative: 
133 
Yes, negative: 
50 
Prefer not to 
answer: 
301 
Data referred to Badghis province population interviewed on the field in 2011-2015. 
 
Data collected in Badghis are really similar to those of Helmand apart 
from people refusing to answer (that are less: around 30%). We could 
interpret this tendency noting that the province is far away Iranian influence 
(compared to Herat) even if there aren’t any mines in the region and Chinese 
influence is limited to commerce of goods (cars and other). In general in 
Badghis too there is a good consideration of Chinese presence and for 
example 403 people out of 978 thinks that Chinese presence is positive and it 
is going to enrich the country. 
At the end we can check data coming from Kandahar province, in the 
South of the country. 
China presence 
and initiatives 
in Afghanistan: 
do you think 
they are useful 
to Afghanistan 
too or just for 
China?  
Useful for both: 
98 
Useful just for 
China: 303 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
278 
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Chinese 
presence: is it 
going to enrich 
Afghan and its 
population (in 
any way) or 
not?  
Enrich, 
especially 
economically: 
 78 
No: 
323 
 Prefer not to 
answer: 
278 
China presence 
in your country 
is it going to 
increase in 
future and you 
think is this a 
positive or 
negative factor? 
Yes, positive: 
75 
No, positive: 
151 
 
No, negative: 
132 
Yes, negative: 
43 
Prefer not to 
answer: 
278 
Data referred to Kandahar province population interviewed on the field in 2011-2015. 
 
 In this case we witness a complete falling of trust in Chinese 
investments and presence. First of all we have to preface that 40% of people 
interviewed prefer not to answer: an huge number, huge especially when 
compared to other provinces. Fear manifested by population is probably 
caused by the historical role of Kandahar as an insurgency strong point. 
Mistrust of Chinese influence takes common people interviewed to declare in 
323 (out of 679 interviewed and 278 refusing to answer) that China is 
investing in Afghanistan just for its proper benefit (they are 80% of people 
answering to the question). There is an enormous diffidence toward China 
and Chinese policy. In Kandahar province there aren’t mines or other 
particular signs of Chinese presence but we can’t explain with just this lack 
of knowledge the 80% of negative perception. Diffidence and mistrust have 
probably ethnic origin, in fact Kandahar is principally inhabited by Pashtuns. 
As explained above, Pashtuns are a fierce tribal population of this country, 
following Tajiks for percentage in Afghanistan have a really strong and 
narrow cultural system called pashtunwali. Pashtunwali code is really strict 
and probably it causes a scarce integration with foreign people, particularly, 
in this case, Chinese. In correspondence with Pashtun ethnic group we 
collected more negative data about Chinese involvement in Afghanistan. 
With the same data I produced a series of three graphics (one for each 
question) which highlight immediately the differences among the five 
provinces (in term of people accepting to answer and positive/negative 
answers): 
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Analyzing data we saw a tendency to consider Chinese presence more 
positively in the higher classes: officials in Kabul and Herat provinces have a 
better opinion compared to common people. The scarcity of knowledge of 
Chinese reality could take less instructed people to the common error of 
considering China (a formally communist State) as directly linked to old 
USSR. We shouldn’t forget the invasion of Afghanistan by a communist 
regime that occupied with violence the region from 1979 to 1989 and left it 
in a Civil War. This can be one of the motivation for the difference of 
opinions in the different samples. 
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Assessing common people opinion in various provinces we noticed a 
vision becoming more and more good starting from provinces with scarce 
Chinese presence to provinces with a bigger amount of Chinese investments. 
For example we noticed a worse opinion in Herat (where there is a really low 
Chinese rate of investments) than in Kabul. This perception has been 
confirmed also during interviews: people not knowing Chinese initiative 
treated them with particular diffidence.  
 
Conclusion: 
This analysis of Chinese interests, policies, and Afghan perception in 
regard of the economic exploitation of Afghan sources needs a fundamental 
preface to better understand Bĕijīng behaviors. It is what discussed in first 
part of the article: Chinese motivations of presence in Afghanistan. China 
knows that its presence in Afghanistan is a stabilizing element to keep on 
exploit afghan mineral sources and, at the same time, is aware that giving 
chances for an economic development to a friendly government is going to 
reduce extremist fall-out in the future (Liu, 2002). Bĕijīng has positioned 
itself as supportive of Afghanistan’s long-term stability and prosperity 
though essentially civilian and limited political, economic, and diplomatic 
assistance. It has also been careful to remain on good terms with the Kabul 
authorities without offending the Pashtuns.  
China’s interests and policies toward Afghanistan generally agreed with 
Islamabad’s desire to improve relations with Kabul, and to prevent excessive 
U.S. pressure and incursions on Pakistani sovereignty. We have also to 
remind traditional friendship between China and Pakistan to maintain which 
both countries are always trying to have same policy in Central Asia 
(especially with Kabul). 
To maintain this policy and its general foreign policy Bĕijīng needs to be 
seen as a peaceful power and to improve its soft power. So the perception of 
Chinese presence by Afghan people it is object of primary importance either 
to avoid future increase of political instability and to increase first Chinese 
foreign policy leverage: soft power.  
Analyzing data on the one hand we have seen that good opinion on 
Chinese presence largely depends on knowledge that Afghan can have of 
Chinese investments and (naturally) from economic benefits that they can 
obtain (in fact in the areas nearer Chinese biggest facilities and installations 
opinion were more positive than in the others). On the other hand we notice 
that where there is scant knowledge of Chinese economic activity or a more 
narrow cultural system (like pashtunwali) we find a bad conception of 
Chinese policy. My main conclusions so is that to improve its influence in 
stabilizing Afghanistan China needs to diversify its investments in type and 
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in geographical location. Also could be really useful for China to work in 
spreading its culture among Afghans like it did in Pakistan.  
For same motivations could be interested to conduct a research 
specifically on this aspect: “How knowledge of Chinese presence can 
influence positively Afghan perception of Chinese investments?” 
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